Review for XZY20
[XZY20] - InPPTD
InPPTD: An Lightweight Incentive-based Privacy-Preserving Truth Discovery for Crowd Sensing Systems
(IEEE Internet of Things Journal)
"... we propose an incentive-based privacy-preserving truth discovery framework, named InPPTD."
Introduction
privacy concerns:
- worker's sensed data
- worker's reliability (i.e., weight)
other issues:
- workers may be lazy and selfish
- workers may maliciously manipulate
two categories:
- single-server scheme
- two-server scheme
single-server scheme:
- achieve the privacy preservation for worker's sensed data and weight
- each worker has to perform costly operation
- workers need to keep online
two-server scheme:
- no costly operation for workers
- cannot guarantee strong privacy protection
research gap:
The existing PPTD schemes, whether with a single server or two servers, have not yet considered the issue of incentives, ...
Related Works
CRH1, optimized CRH2, TruthFinder3: do not consider participants' privacy
single-server scheme:
- Miao et al.4, threshold Paillier cryptosystem
- Zheng et al.5, lightweight homomorphic encryption, on-line, weight tamper
- Xu et al.6, lightweight homomorphic encryption, on-line, weight tamper
- Li et al.78, local differential privacy
two-server scheme:
requirements:
- high efficiency
- workers' failure resistance
- data and weight privacy preservation
- resistance to the modification attack from malicious workers
- reduction of lazy workers
System Model
entities:
- Service Provider (SP)
- Cloud Provider (CP)
- Workers
three phases:
- Report Phase
- Iteration Phase
- Rewards Phase
Report Phase:
- worker reports his perturbed sensed data to CP
- random number is uploaded to SP
For SP: PK=(N,g), SK=(\lamda, \mu)
Iteration Phase:
- CP computes the secure distance function, sens \prod_{k=1}^K C_k and C_k^{2^{a_k}} to SP
- SP decrypts, and obtains w_k-a_k
- SP sends E(w_k-a_k) and E(\sum_{k=1}^K(w_k-a_k)\cdot r_{m,k}) to CP
- CP computes E(\sum_{k=1}^K w_kx_m,k) and E(\sum_{k=1}^K w_k), and sends to SP
- SP decrypts, and computes ground truth t_m
For sensed data x_{m,k}, worker chooses two random numbers r_{m,k},r'_{m,k}:
to SP: random values to CP: perturbed data
For SP:
to CP: encrypted random values
For CP:
Secure Weight Estimation:
For CP:
computes the secure distance function E((x_{m,k} - t_m)^2)
aggregates the distance of objects and workers:
chooses a random number a_k, computes C'_{k} = (C_k)^{2^{a_k}}
to SP: C'_k and C
SP:
decrypts and computes w_k - a_k
Truth Estimation:
For SP:
computes E(\sum_{k=1}^K(w_k - a_k)\cdot r_{m,k})
to CP: E(w_k - a_k)
For CP:
computes:
and E(\sum_{k=1}^K w_kx_{m,k})
to SP: E(\sum_{k=1}^K w_kx_{m,k}), E(\sum_{k=1}^K w_k)
For SP:
t_m = \sum_{k=1}^K w_kx_{m,k} / \sum_{k=1}^K w_k
Rewards Phase:
- each worker redeem his rewards from SP
For CP:
aggregates all random numbers S^i = \sum_{k=1}^K a_k
For SP:
computes the total weight W^i = \sum_{k=1}^K (w_k - a_k) + S^i
For CP:
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